

1. DISCLAIMER

Report on ODA to South Africa for GTZ by Pramod Daya and Rajen Govender.

Responsibility

This report was financed by GTZ as part of their aid programme to the Government of South Africa. However, the views and recommendations contained in this report are those of the consultant, and GTZ is not responsible for or bound to the recommendations made.

Thanks

We wish to extend our grateful appreciation to the Development Counsellors and their administrative staff who gave their time to participate in this exercise.

2. CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Total ODA Commitments by Donor (ZAR 000s).....	19
Table 2: Sector Commitments from 1994 to 1999 (ZAR 000s).....	22

MAIN REPORT

1. DISCLAIMER	2
2. Contents.....	3
List of tables	3
Main Report	3
3. Executive Summary	4
4. Introductory remarks	5
5. Methodological Issues	6
5.1. Data Collection	6
6. Development of a Data Collection Instrument and User Manual	7
7. Data Validity Assessment	9
7.1. Defining a common measuring system	9
7.2. Response from Donors	10
7.3. Currency Conversions	11
7.4. Validity Checks	11
8. Summary.....	13
9. Analysis of ODA from 1994 to 1999.....	13
9.1. South Africa at a glance	13
9.2. ODA Commitments to South Africa by Year	17
9.3. ODA Commitments by Donor.....	18
Table One: Total ODA Commitments by Donor (ZAR 000s).....	19
9.4. Sector Commitments	21
9.5. ODA Commitments to National Government and Provincial Administrations.....	24
9.6. ODA Commitments to Institutional Recipients.....	25
10. Discussion and Summary	28
11. Bibliography	30
12. Appendix A: Fields of Data Contained in the Data Collection Programme	31

3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The nature of DCR studies conducted in the past has been to focus largely on the quantitative measure of ODA to developing countries. While the brief for the data collection team in the context of this DCR has been to collect accurate data on development assistance to South Africa, our work is conducted within the context of the studies conducted in parallel with the sector teams so as to provide a broader perspective.

The general assumption in prior such studies has been the availability of data that would provide an accurate measure of development assistance to South Africa. We have adopted the approach that there is an insufficient depth and breadth of formal financial reporting by donor countries, and that the needs of this study would be best met by collecting this data from the source, i.e. from the donor community. Our approach was to develop a data collection instrument, namely a software programme that was custom developed for this exercise, which was distributed to the donors and which underpinned the exercise in several key ways. These are:

1. The accuracy of the data would be high, as it would be drawn from project data held by the donors.
2. The validity of the data would be tested by re-submitting the collected data to the donor community for validation. This has proven to be a valuable exercise as errors and corrections have emerged during this process.
3. A uniform taxonomy for projects was adopted, viz. the OECD/DAC table 5. While acknowledged to have shortcomings within the South Africa context, it provides a way to measure and compare the depth of assistance in the different sectors of activity.

The products of this study are principally the comprehensive data set representing all ODA data for all donors for the period 1994 to 1999, and secondarily, this report, which not only documents the methodology of the study but also provides some preliminary qualitative inferences from the analyses of the data.

Apart from the substantive findings derived from the analyses of the data, our principal findings from the study are as follows:

- (i) Comprehensive information on donor assistance is extremely important to both the donors – for the formulation of coherent development strategies - and the South African Government – for the coherent co-ordination of multiple sources, modalities and intents of donor assistance. As such, it represents a mission critical aspect of donor assistance.
- (ii) A common system of classification of projects must be defined. While the OECD/DAC table was generally agreed upon by the donor community and the S.A. Government for this exercise, cross cutting issues such as Women in Development and General Environment Protection were excluded. Additionally, critical developing country issues areas such as poverty alleviation are also excluded from current donor taxonomies.
- (iii) A rigorous data collection methodology, which depends on deriving data from the source, must be adopted to assure a high degree of accuracy. The degree of rigour has a significant impact on the authenticity, reliability and acceptability of data by the recipient country and donors, and ultimately impacts on the nature and extent of its use as a productive resource.

4. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The format of the South African DCR II differs significantly from both the conventional methodology for DCRs as well as the methodology of the first phase of the DCR conducted in this country. It is important to reflect on these differences as they have a significant impact on both the methodology of the DCR II project as well as the structure of this report.

To begin with, the focus of DCR (both elsewhere and in South Africa) has traditionally been on the reporting and analysis of quantitative information in a relatively politically neutral manner, and usually according to a relatively standardised format¹. While commentary and interpretation of the quantitative information was encouraged, the predominant thrust was the review of ODA by analysis of the quantity and nature of financial flows to sectors of destination, institutional recipients, etc. The DCR II project in South Africa differs fundamentally from this approach in that the focus is not primarily on the quantitative information (or analysis thereof). Rather, the project adopts a multimethod approach, collecting not only quantitative information to record the flow of ODA in the manner typical of other DCRs, but also focussing on detailed investigations of the sectors of destination by way of impact assessment studies within each sector. The object of this methodology is thus to extend the research and analysis beyond that which is conventionally required by, and derived from, the DCR methodology. The implication of this is that this DCR does not place the quantitative analysis at its centre, but rather employs it to provide a global picture of the ODA while relying the sector studies to provide the finer resolution and detail.

Secondly, DCR work is generally undertaken by foreign consultants, working to a brief determined largely by the UNDP itself and which satisfies its own requirements and expectations of the DCR. This was in fact how the first South African DCR was undertaken in 1993. The DCR II, however, employed predominantly local consultants, and the brief was defined by the UNDP in conjunction with the Chief Directorate: International Development Co-operation (IDC) of the Department of Finance in the South African government. The rationale behind the joint determination of the project was to ensure a product which would not only serve the needs of the UNDP and the donor community but, and equally importantly, would also add considerable value to the South African government's declared efforts to play a more active role in the management and co-ordination of ODA to the country. For this reason, the principal product of the quantitative data collection aspect of this DCR was not the conventional reporting of the analysis, but rather the development of an information facility in the form of a database which would provide the IDC with the capability to properly plan and execute its management and co-ordination responsibilities in partnership with the donor community. Hence the project Logical Framework Analysis for DCR II included the following as a key output:

- the production of a comprehensive, disaggregated, accurate and usable dataset for SA, covering the period April 1994 to March 1999.²

The additional requirement was that the database conform as much as is possible to the Project Management System of the IDC while simultaneously ensuring it has sufficient compatibility with the generic DCR format to ensure comparability with information collected via DCRs conducted in other countries.

The implication of these format differences on the methodology of this project are easily discernible, the most significant being the use of impact assessment methodologies rather

than conventional survey methodologies to achieve the desired ODA review. Derivative of this, the second implication was the need for effective triangulation of the data and analysis derived from the different bases, and the successful integration of the quantitative and qualitative outputs in the DCR report.

The implication of these methodology and format differences on the structure of this report are therefore as follows:

1. Given that the key product of the data collection aspect was the development of a comprehensive database, this report focuses on relevant aspects of research methodology and data validity, and the extent to which they impact the overall utility and integrity of the database.
2. Given that this DCR has commissioned a series of impact assessment studies within the relevant sectors, this report does not attempt to provide by itself an exhaustive review of ODA to South Africa. Rather, the analyses provides an overall picture at the most disaggregated levels in order to complement and overlap with the more focussed and detailed analyses contained in the sector specific impact studies. The report will, however, provide the manner of analysis that is characteristic of DCRs conducted in other countries.
3. This report will also highlight methodological issues that impact either directly or indirectly on the capability of the IDC to effectively undertake the intended level of management and co-ordination of ODA to South Africa.

5. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The following issues reflect a critical departure from the first phase of the South Africa DCR.

5.1. DATA COLLECTION

A critical shortcoming of the first phase of the South African DCR was the extent to which the quantitative information representing the flow of ODA from individual donors to South Africa was contested. The data was derived from a database compiled by and belonging to the IDC, and its accuracy and validity were strongly contested, and the data eventually rejected, by the donors. To avoid this problem, the DCR II adopted the posture that there is no single organisation that has authoritative knowledge of the total volume of ODA to South Africa. It consequently undertook to collect the data directly from the source, i.e., from the representatives of the donor countries and that of the multi-lateral donor agencies. The collection of all data from its source was intended to not only eliminate the errors inherent in second hand data, but also to ensure that donor organisations themselves assumed a modicum of responsibility for determining the validity of the data applicable to them.

The collection of data from donor organisations, while considerably more desirable than using a second hand source, nevertheless has its own problems and pitfalls. Principal amongst these are the following:

1. The rate of response – numerous DCRs have highlighted the problem of a poor response rate from donor organisations. In some cases the rate of non-response has

been estimated to be as high as 50%, and while a second iteration of the data collection process usually improves this figure, there still remains an average non-response rate of between 10% and 15%³. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately estimate the quantity of ODA that is attributable to those donor agencies who do not respond with data.

2. Validity checks on the data – apart from validity checks at the time of data processing (which will be addressed later on in this report) a critical stage of validation occurs precisely at the point at which data is entered into the format required for its transmission to the research team. In this instance the validity of the data may be compromised by a series of factors. Firstly, it may be compromised by the actual data entry, in that errors are made in the entry of the information. Secondly, the data source itself (in the form of records) may be compromised or inadequate. For instance, the local office might not possess records that are comprehensive or complete, implying that whatever data is provided (no matter how accurately it is entered), is still not entirely valid as it does not properly represent the quantity and quality of transactions between the donor and the recipients of the funding. This is usually a significant problem if the donor organisation is not in possession of a proper accounting and/or project management system.
3. Incompatibility of data formats – a third problem with data collection is the variety and multiplicity of formats by which data is classified and stored by different donor organisations. The formatting of data usually impacts at three levels. Firstly, it refers to the fields and categories that are used to store the data by the donor organisations. While some donors use fields detailing information at the level of individual projects, others may only have information relevant to the sectors, implying that data cannot be consistently collected consistently from all donors. Secondly, the donor organisations subscribe to a number of taxonomies for the classification of their projects, implying, for instance, that a project placed within a particular sector by one donor using the DAC sectors may easily fall within another sector if classified according to another donor or if one were using the UNDP sector categories. The problem of the classification of projects, particularly in terms of the sector of destination, the type of ODA, and the designated recipients is especially pronounced if there are, as is the case with South Africa, a large number of donor agencies operating in the country. Thirdly, donor organisations use different software for the storage of their data, and not all of these software packages are compatible or capable of being modified to be so. This is a severe (and sometimes intractable) complication in terms of the collation and processing of master datasets from individual donor submissions.

To address these (potential) problems, the DCR II undertook a series of initiatives, each of which is discussed in the following section.

6. DEVELOPMENT OF A DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENT AND USER MANUAL

The team was presented with a questionnaire which had been developed in a focus group discussion with the donor organisations. The objective of the focus group was to establish the fields of information that would be most critical for the review, and, equally importantly, to arrive at an acceptable compromise between what was required by the DCR II project and what could realistically be provided by the donor organisations. This questionnaire was

subsequently revised with inputs from the donors to ensure that there was sufficient consensus on the type of information it sought to obtain. Following this exercise, the team undertook to translate the questionnaire into a (software based) data collection instrument. The software programme was developed in Delphi, and was designed to be transmitted to all donors on a single diskette. A working version of the programme was developed and presented to the donor organisations at a second focus group session to test for user friendliness and adequacy of data requirements. Following this workshop, at which donor representatives gave their approval of the instrument, the programme was further refined and tested before a final version was developed for distribution to the donors. The final version included numerous internal checks to assist the data entry process by highlighting, *inter alia*, possible contradictions in coding, errors in summation, and incomplete and/or empty data fields.

In sum, the data collection programme was intended to achieve the following:

1. To ensure that all donors responded by providing the data in the same format, in order to streamline and guarantee proper collation and processing of individual datasets into a single, master dataset.
2. To ensure that donors would themselves assume responsibility for the validity of their data, by checking it against that which was present in their records, but also by utilising the checks built into the programme itself.
3. To ensure, overall, that the data collection process was made as user friendly as was possible so as to increase the probability of receiving the data from the donors.

Additionally, it emerged from the various meetings with the donors that many of them did not feel entirely confident about reporting in considerable detail on all six years of the review period (from 1994 to 1999). It was therefore agreed that the data would be collected in two ways:

- firstly, detailed, project level information for the most recent years (1998-1999),
- and secondly, annualised summary information for the earlier years (1994-1997).

However, donors were encouraged, where possible, to provide data at the smallest level of detail (project level) as this would increase the statistical and analytic power of the information and consequently the capability of the database.

To further facilitate the collection of valid data, the team developed a comprehensive user manual to accompany the software programme. The manual not only covered aspects of the operation and functioning of the programme itself, but also included detailed descriptions and guides to the definition of key concepts and the classification of projects by sector, recipient, etc. The manual, together with the software programme, was provided to all donors by way of courier, and all donors were provided with the opportunity to return the data in whatever mode was most convenient to them. In most instances, this comprised returns by email, though many also returned the diskette by courier.

Finally, as an additional measure to ensure minimal problems with the process, the team made available to all donors - by way of a protocol team - expertise in both the software

programme and research and sampling methodology. The brief of the protocol team was to provide all necessary assistance to the donors for the successful collection of the data. The team was used extensively by the donor agencies, and it also ensured regular follow-ups with all agencies. A database was developed by the DCR II team to detail all of the face-to-face, telephonic and electronic interactions between this team and each donor. This record is available for public scrutiny.

7. DATA VALIDITY ASSESSMENT

As indicated earlier, the principal objective of both the data collection programme and the methodology whereby it was developed and utilised was to ensure that the process of data collection was robust and that the data collected was of the highest possible validity. In this section, we comment on the extent to which these objectives were achieved.

7.1. DEFINING A COMMON MEASURING SYSTEM

The single largest obstacle to the formulation of a standardised data collection instrument was the taxonomy to be used for the determination of the sectors of destination. This is entirely understandable given that donor agencies typically adhere to the formats that are standard for the donor systems with which they are most closely identified. Hence donors who are most closely aligned with the UN system were likely to use the UNDP DCAS taxonomy, while those more closely aligned to the OECD would employ the DAC taxonomy. Additionally, many donors have their own unique taxonomy developed by their home offices.

To achieve consistency in the taxonomy of sectors of destination, the DCR II team investigated the nature of current classification systems amongst the donors as well as the extent of use of these systems. Based on this analysis, as well as an acknowledgement of the requirements of the DCR process, it was decided that the DAC system (Table 5: DAC Statistical Reporting Directives⁴) would be the most equitable system for this study. Notwithstanding some concerns expressed by some donors, the majority were in agreement that the DAC system was probably the most impartial system and, more importantly, most closely approximated the format required of the DCR II. This system was thereafter formally adopted by the donors for the purposes of this study.

Once the DAC system has been adopted, donors were quick to reach agreement on the other aspects of the measuring system, most notably the categories for the determination of the terms of assistance (grants, loans, credit guarantees, etc.), type of recipient (government, NGOs, Parastatals, etc.) and institutional level of (government) recipients (national, provincial and local). A copy of the data fields contained in the data collection programme can be found in Appendix A.

Comprehensive definitions of both the DAC categories and the additional categories mentioned above were provided in the user manual. Additionally, and given that many donors would have retrospectively reclassified their projects into the DAC sectors, the user manual also provided extensive information and direction to assist with this classification. The guidance provided was obtained from the DAC Statistical Reporting Directives manual.

In sum, then, the use of focus group exercises with the donor community and the development of the data collection instrument ensured that all data, at least by way of methodology and design, would be both valid and submitted in a common format. In

execution, the results were highly satisfactory, with the majority of donors willingly conforming to both the classification system as well as the required data format. The exceptions to this are discussed in the following section.

7.2. RESPONSE FROM DONORS

In conjunction with the donor agencies, the team developed a formal timeframe for the data collection process. The timeframe set dates for the distribution of the programme, the entry of data by the donors, and finally, the return of the data to the DCR II team.

The responses from the donor organisations to the data collection may be described along two axes:

- Participation: Supply of data to the DCR II team
- Co-operation: Compliance with the data entry formats specified by the DCR II team, and, using these two axes, classified into three categories:
 1. Participation with full co-operation – reassuringly, the majority of the donors fell into this category. These included the largest bilateral and multilateral agencies.
 2. Participation with no co-operation – this category refers to donor organisations who provided the data but did not do so in the format specified by the DCR II team. In essence, these donors merely provided the data in whatever format they currently stored it, with little or no regard for the presence of the critical fields and variables. The particular instances of this were the responses from Australia and Austria, the former submitting its response to the DAC survey and the latter merely providing its own records. In both instances, significant effort was expended to ensure that the format of the data was modified to resemble that of the DCR II data collection programme. This was done without editing or modifying the actual data itself. The translation proved only moderately successful, and apart from the year of commitment and sector of destination, little else in these two datasets resembles the fields contained in the datasets of the donors from the first category. Both these datasets were, however, included in the master dataset to ensure, at the very least, that this quantum of OAD is represented in the macro-level analysis.
 3. Non-participation – this category refers to those donors who did not submit any data to the DCR team, despite repeated reminders, visits and consultations. In all such instances the IDC was requested to facilitate the collection of the data from these donor organisations, but also to no avail. It was particularly disturbing to note the high-handed and indifferent manner in which these donor organisations responded to the DCR II team and the entreaties of the IDC. Given that the very premise of the DCR is to facilitate greater co-operation between the IDC and the donors, this was not a very promising indication. This matter will be discussed in greater detail in the section on recommendations.

7.3. CURRENCY CONVERSIONS

Another critical problem raised with the first phase of the South African DCR was the lack of clarity/validity of the currency conversions. The exchange rates whereby conversions were undertaken by the research team were strongly contested by the donors, though in all fairness it must be noted that this contestation was justified as the conversion conducted by the researchers was neither transparent nor entirely valid.

Of particular significance in this matter was the determination of the specific year for which a conversion is to be made, as the year typically determines the conversion rate and therefore has an impact on the sum of ODA when represented in South African Rands (ZAR). Indeed, given the fluctuation (and consistently downward movement) of the ZAR between 1994 and 1999 against a basket of the major foreign currencies, it was apparent that using conversion rates closer to 1994 levels would artificially deflate the quantity of ODA by as much as 20 to 25% (when reflected in ZAR), while use of a conversion rate closer to 1999 levels would have the opposite effect. It also appears evident from the first phase of the DCR that, in the absence of a valid conversion process, donors might easily have chosen to endorse the conversion rate/s that would reflect more positively on themselves. However, this would create problems for the IDC in its attempt to properly audit and review the ODA for this period, especially when it has to examine ODA in the context of government's annual and multi-year budgets. To rationalise the process and eliminate the possibility of such problems, the DCR II team decided on the following:

1. That all donors should provide the necessary data in the currency of their choice i.e., in the currency of operation, and that all conversions to ZAR would then be undertaken by the DCR II team.
2. That all currency conversions will be effected according to the year in which the original commitment was made. This was deemed the most appropriate format as it properly reflected the period in which the annual negotiations were conducted and wherein the quantity of ODA was determined.
3. That the conversion would be effected using an annualised average rate for each of the foreign currencies against the ZAR for the particular year in question.
4. That the currency conversion rates would be obtained from the South African Reserve Bank, as it represented the most authoritative and impeccable source for this information.

Once again, this methodology for the conversion of foreign currencies was discussed with the donors to ensure adequate acceptance on their part.

7.4. VALIDITY CHECKS

Finally, and notwithstanding the various methodological and other mechanisms and instruments employed to ensure minimal corruption of the data, a series of validity checks were conducted during the data processing stage. The objective of this exercise was to measure the degree of validity achieved by the methodology and the data collection instrument, as well as to ensure that data that did pass these validity checks were not corrupted in other possible ways. The validity of each dataset set was therefore additionally assessed using the following procedures:

1. Test for user and system missing values – user values refer to values defined by the users (the donor organisations) as missing (not available at the time of data entry) while system missing values refer to data that might be missing because of a failure to populate certain fields in the data collection instrument. As discussed before, the instrument was designed to avert such omissions, but there was no guarantee that every omission would be covered. In sum, this first validity check was run to determine if values provided were legitimate. For instance, does a zero value for a data field imply a real value (say, for instance, for disbursement) or does it imply that the field was overlooked? In general, this level of validity was found to be exceptionally high, largely due to the robustness of the data collection instrument. However, there were still problems with some of the datasets, and these indicated that missing data had more to do with a poor response by the donors than the actual omission of data. A good example of this was the figures for disbursement. While the majority of records in the master dataset contained valid figures (be or zero or otherwise) for disbursement, some donors simply refused to provide these figures. Of the over 1300 records, about 15% have no disbursement figures, and this was due entirely (as was communicated to the DCR team) to the donor's unwillingness/inability to furnish this information. It is for this reason that the disbursement figures cannot be used in the overall analyses, and it is rather the commitment figures which are used consistently throughout all of the analyses.
2. Test for out of range values – this test sought to determine if inappropriate (unacceptable) values might have been inadvertently entered into the data collection programme. The check revealed several potentially invalid entries, including one which indicated a budget for a single project of 1,300 trillion US dollars, and another that indicated a disbursement for a single project of over 2 billion US dollars. In all instances, the data was referred to the donor organisation for correction and subsequently returned for collation into the master dataset. It must be acknowledged, however, that this test would only have identified extremely invalid values, and might easily have overlooked values which were invalid by not necessarily extreme. This issue, the extent to which the data accurately reflected the actual records of the donor, could not be addressed except by insisting that donors ensure the highest standard of probity in the data entry phase. To operationalise this requirement, the team committed itself to providing all data back to donors for further checks.
3. Tests for anomalies – the last validity check tested for anomalies that could not have been defined beforehand but which might have been evident in the data. Given that the study spanned the transition from 1999 to 2000, one of the critical factors flagged for attention was the possibility of anomalies that might arise from donors data systems not being Y2K compliant. Although the data collection programme was intended to eliminate this possibility, the submission of datasets by some donors in their original format did make this a distinct reality. Of the three datasets submitted in original format, only one (Austria) was found to contain problems as a result of Y2K non-compliance. In this instance, start and end dates for projects had incorrectly reset themselves to the year 1900. The relevant calendar fields were flagged for attention in the master dataset, with a caution issued on their use for future analyses.

In general, however, and notwithstanding the above mentioned problems the data was found to reflect very few inconsistencies or anomalies, a result primarily of the decision to use a standardised dedicated data collection programme.

8. SUMMARY

The various checks introduced into the methodology were motivated by the experiences of DCRs elsewhere as well as the first phase of the DCR conducted in 1999 in South Africa, all of which hinted at factors that would possibly or actually impact the validity of the data. The objective of the methodological innovations was thus to ensure sufficient rigour so as to at worst minimise, or at best eliminate, potential sources of data corruption and distortion. Based on all of the validity checks conducted both during the data collection process as well as during the data processing and collation stages, it was concluded that the data was of very high validity and consequently readily amenable to the required review. In the next section, we analyse and discuss some of the aspects of ODA flows to South Africa between 1994 to 1999.

9. ANALYSIS OF ODA FROM 1994 TO 1999

To briefly recap, the analysis of ODA contained in this report derives from the following three premises:

1. That unlike other DCR projects, the focus of the South African DCR II is principally on the qualitative impact assessment studies conducted within relevant sectors, rather than on the quantitative aspects, hence there is no requirement for a detailed exploration of the quantitative information.
2. That to ensure greater comparability with other DCR reports, the quantitative analyses required for this DCR II should conform to the requirements of the UNDP Development Co-operation Analysis System (DCAS), in that it should employ the quantitative data to achieve an analysis that is principally descriptive and seeks to comment, at the highest level of aggregation, on the flows of ODA by quantity and type.
3. That further detailed exploration and analyses of the quantitative data, at levels of aggregation ranging from the global to the micro level, are to be made possible via the development and installation in the IDC of a comprehensive, dynamic and user friendly database on all ODA flows to the country from 1994 to 1999.

This analyses will therefore seek to ask a set of simple questions in order to provide an overall description of ODA flows to South Africa at the most global level. In this sense it must be considered as only an foreword to the more thorough and rigorous analyses required to properly achieve the following objectives of this DCR II:

1. realising greater South African control and ownership of ODA;
2. ensuring the installation of institutional arrangements that will enhance the effective management and co-ordination of ODA according to the developmental prescripts of the South African government⁵.

9.1. SOUTH AFRICA AT A GLANCE

South Africa has consistently represented a special case to the international donor community. Prior to 1994, the flow of ODA to the country was governed within the rubric of the anti-apartheid framework, with donors deliberately choosing to bypass the state and its

agencies and instead steering funding directly to organisations and agencies within civil society (principally NGOs). Additionally, given the hostile attitude of the state to many of the civil society organisations, the regulatory framework for the effective management and monitoring of these funds and the evaluation of their impact on civil society was largely (and deliberately) absent, with most recipients enjoying the freedom to allocate and spend funds largely at the discretion of organisational management and/or the governing boards, and to maintain records of these transactions in non-transparent ways so as to deter or obstruct close scrutiny by the state. Given this focus of ODA on civil society agencies deemed to be in opposition to the state, it is to be expected, as was revealed in the first DCR conducted in 1993⁶, that the beneficiaries of this ODA were agencies and institutions operating principally within the sectors of community empowerment and development, human rights protection, provision of legal aid (especially for cases against the state), promotion of democracy, and education and training.

In sum, then, ODA to South Africa prior to 1994 may be characterised as follows:

1. The rationale of ODA was to empower those agencies and sectors of society that were anti-apartheid in nature and intent; and,
2. The modality of ODA was to bypass the state and directly fund civil society organisations, with the management and monitoring of these funds left to the discretion of the recipients.

The 1994 democratic elections in South Africa signaled a significant change in the posture and intent of the international donor community towards the country. These changes were principally determined by three factors:

1. The first was a general review and rethinking by the donor community of the intent and purpose of ODA globally. This review was precipitated by a combination of increasing budgetary constraints being applied by donor countries, the need to ensure greater direct impact by ODA and better assessment thereof, and the need to synchronise the structure and outputs of ODA with the developmental agenda of recipient countries. This thinking was reflected in the seminal 1996 DAC document *Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Developmental Co-operation*.
2. The second was a rethinking of the status of South Africa, largely due to the demise of the apartheid state and the installation of democratic state, and consequently, the need to consider both the developmental requirements of the country as well as its requirements in a critical period of transition.
3. The third factor follows from the second, and entailed a review of the relationship between the donor community and a (South African) government that was seen to be representative of the needs and aspirations of the South African people, and therefore, to be considered as an ally and significant institutional partner - and not an obstacle - in the directing and management of donor funding.

This qualitative review process was further complicated by the fact that many donor countries found it difficult to define the developmental status of South Africa. If one looked at factors such as the level of general infrastructure in the country, the sophistication of the financial services sector, the differentiation within the economy, etc., then the country would

appear not to be a traditional recipient of aid. Rather, and given its delicately negotiated and managed political transition, it appeared that the principal focus of ODA should be in the strengthening and consolidation of the democratisation process. The salience of this position was further emphasized by the commonly accepted role required of South Africa *vis-à-vis* the region and the continent. ODA in this sense was considered an important instrument to enhance the role played by the country in the democratisation and upliftment of the continent, and the flow of funds into South Africa was deemed to have valuable cascading effects for other African countries.

However, when viewed from the lens of general human development, it was apparent that there existed in South Africa significant disparities within the population in terms of income, access to basic services in education, health, water and sanitation, and overall quality of life. From this perspective, the country did represent a traditional recipient of aid. Notwithstanding its apparent and manifest strength as an economic and political power on the continent, it still ranked lower than some African and many other developing countries on the Human Development Index (the HDI is a composite index derived from the GDP per capita, education and literacy levels, and life expectancy). The UN Human Development Report of 1999 (providing assessments for 1997) reveals a dramatic and intriguing picture of this incongruence. Despite being ranked tenth out of 93 countries in the Medium Human Development category in terms of real GDP per capita, the country was actually ranked 55th on the Human Development Index⁷. This discrepancy was further illustrated by the score obtained on the GDP/HDI index. This index, which indicates the extent to which the HDI rank is better (as reflected by a positive value) or worse (as indicated by a negative value) than the real GDP per capita rank, was determined to be minus 47 for South Africa, placing it at position of 92 out of the 93 countries in the category. This almost schizophrenic nature is further confirmed by the country's ranking in terms of other important human development indices assessing gender empowerment, human poverty in developing countries, and trends in human development and per capita income. Taken collectively, they suggest that superficial descriptions of the country, especially those limited to the volume of its economic activity and outputs, the relative sophistication of certain types of infrastructure and sectoral activity, and demands for imported goods and services, do not provide an adequate assessment onto which one may attach a framework for ODA.

Cognisant of the considerable developmental challenges confronting it and the fledgling democracy, the South African government itself undertook a programme to define and implement its developmental agenda. The principal instruments of this agenda were and are as follows:


1. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which provided the overarching policy framework within which the government sought to pursue and achieve the objective of realising a equitable and prosperous society;
2. The Growth, Employment and redistribution Strategy (GEAR), which was shaped as a key instrument for the realisation of the policy objectives of the RDP; and,
3. The Medium Term Expenditure Framework MTEF), which was intended to give practical expression to the policies and programmes indicated by both the RDP and GEAR by providing for a more transparent multi-year budget planning process⁸.

In the 1998 Budget Review the Minister of Finance lists the following as the priorities of the MTEF:

1. Meeting basic needs – principally in education, health, water and sanitation, social services, welfare, land reform and housing.
2. Accelerating infrastructure development – ensuring investment in infrastructure, upgrading of roads, undertaking of spatial development initiatives (SDIs), and addressing urban renewal principally via private public partnerships.
3. Economic growth, development and job creation – the stimulated building of the economy to achieve sustainable, accelerated growth with correspondent redistribution in opportunities and income.
4. Human resource development – the education and training of citizens in pre-primary, formative, tertiary, technical institutions and lifelong education and training for adults, the unemployed and out of school youth.
5. Safety and security – The transformation of the criminal justice, police and prisons administration and the improvement in national defence and disaster management.
6. Transformation of government – the strengthening of administration and good governance and the implementation of a code of conduct (*Batho Pele – People First*) for service delivery by the public sector.

To review then, it was the emergent developmental agenda of the South African government, the transition from an apartheid state to a constitutional democracy, and the budgetary and other issues confronting the donor community that provided the backdrop against which bilateral and multilateral negotiations were conducted to determine ODA flows to South Africa after 1994. In the sections that follow, attempts will be made to locate the individual analyses of ODA flows against this multidimensional canvas.

9.2. ODA COMMITMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA BY YEAR




he total volume of ODA provided to South Africa from 1994 to 199 was determined from this exercise to be R15,533m. Figure One lists the volume of ODA commitments to South Africa for the each of the years in the six year review period.

As is evident from Figure 1, the allocation of ODA to SA shows a distinctive trend from 1994 to 1999, or more accurately, two sets of trends. The first trend covers the period 1994 to 1997, and indicates a steady year on year increase in ODA until a peak is reached in 1997. The slight dip between 1994 and 1995 is largely artificial, as the 1994 figure includes two large projects (of approximately R900m in value) which actually began at the start of the decade and which will continue until 2002/2003. When the effect of these two projects is controlled for, the first trend is shown to be consistently upward until 1997. This first upward trend may be argued to reflect the increasing number of bilateral and multilateral agreements reached as the newly elected democratic government of 1994 undertook to establish, and in some cases, re-establish, diplomatic links with donor countries and agencies during the first few years of its rule. The second trend, which indicates a downward movement from 1997 to 1999, reflects two possibilities. The first is that 1997 reflects the absolute peaking of all ODA commitments to the newly installed government, and the second is that the decline may indicate that the largesse demonstrated by donors to the new government is on the wane. This is especially so if one observes the sudden drop between 1998 and 1999, the year in which the second government was elected. In essence, the overall trend from 1994 to 1999 indicates that much of the ODA was motivated by a desire to concretise support to the new government of the day, and that the support has started to decline on the basis that the country had already held its second election and thus passed from the first critical stage of transition towards the second stage of consolidation and normalisation.

Additionally, it is necessary to comment briefly on the extent to which the total ODA provided by this sample is an underestimate the actual amount provided to the country. This project failed to secure responses from 10% of the donor agencies, and it is estimated that the volume of ODA attributable to these particular donors would range between R500m and R750m over the six year period. This would indicate that the figure of R15,533m obtained from this sample may underestimate ODA by between 3% and 5%, and that the actual ODA

may amount to over R16,000m, which would indicate an average of between R2,500 m and R3.000m per year, a figure consistent with many previous and informal estimates.

Finally, and to provide further context, it is useful to consider the volume of ODA as a percentage of the annual national and provincial expenditure of the South African government and as a percentage of the South African GDP. Figure 2 provides an indication of this assessment using the budget and GDP figures derived from the 1998, 1999 and 2000 Budget Reviews published by the Department of Finance (the figures for 1994 are not available). All budget figures reflect actual (revised) expenditure^{9,10,11}.



The assessment of ODA commitments against the national budget of the South African government confirms the overall trend in ODA commitments identified earlier, with 1997 signaling the peak of donor assistance and thereafter donor assistance entering a downward trend. Significantly, the downward trend between 1997 and 1999 is that much more dramatic when seen against the national budget than when viewed on its own. While ODA commitments in 1999 constituted 39% of the volume of ODA commitments of 1997, when viewed as a proportion of the national budget, the figure for 1999 is 33,4% that of the corresponding figure for 1997. Likewise, the trend when total ODA commitments is viewed against the South African GDP is almost identical to that for comparison against the national budget, with a gradual upward movement from 1995 to 1997, and thereafter a downward movement to 1998 and a sudden, sharp drop to 1999.


9.3. ODA COMMITMENTS BY DONOR

Table 1 details the total commitments for each donor for the entire period from 1994 to 1999.

DONOR	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	Total
Australia	5,571	75,832	9,739	67,634	20,323		179,101
Austria	149	7,922	8,107	8,128			24,308
Belgium	5,078	44,632	3,476	34,646	6,336	2,892	97,060
IDRC	10,037	10,523	6,439	19,656	18,829	11,981	77,466
China					137,137		137,137
Denmark	118,054	84,859	167,060	115,609	11,647		497,228
EU		577,862	690,599	663,371	791,743		2,723,576
Finland		9,547	62,002	18,274			89,827
Flanders	390	2,874	2,723	3,218	4,094	2,422	15,721
GTZ	412,703	103,532	382,273	29,150	208,463	117,361	1,253,481
ILO	60				166	440	666
Ireland	10,040	6,684	6,306	52,714	5,549	12,823	94,117
Italy	6,221	4,940	3,615	85,298	3,227	1,895	105,195
Japan	9,808	16,341	324,236	320,539	68,594	49,725	789,243
Norway	139,432	49,660	21,590	88,410	83,760	29,723	412,544
Netherlands	9,859	94,240	124,691	96,993	132,228	102,202	560,212
Spain		8,082	1,002	6,709			15,793
SIDA	88,071	259,696	58,532	242,268	181,757	271,938	1,102,263
SDC	26,925	19,957	74,403	58,008	60,064	20,934	260,290
DFID	41,101	75,566	37,384	24,139	38,647	114,917	331,754
UNICEF				22,140	19,029	24,284	65,453
UNDP	1,913	63,177	9,054	57,000	28,703	25,144	184,991
UNESCO			728	2,334			3,062
UNFPA		3,445	6,870	9,661	667		20,752
USAID	1,341,413	530,914	566,766	706,168	102,331		3,247,592
WB	2,661				1,975	6,296	10,932
EIB	209,820	210,872	299,305	1,035,380	828,729	649,283	3,233,388
TOTAL	2,439,156	2,253,385	2,865,989	3,765,195	2,762,136	1,444,259	15,533,184

Table One: Total ODA Commitments by Donor (ZAR 000s)

As Table 1 reveals, the five largest donors were USAID, followed by the European Investment Bank, the European Union, German Development Co-operation, and Sweden. Collectively, these five donors account for R11,560m or 74.4% of the total ODA committed over the six year period. The breakdown of this majority portion according to the terms of assistance is captured in the figure below.




The biggest volume of grants amongst the five largest donors came from the European Union, followed by USAID, which together account for 73% of all grants provided amongst these five donors, while the biggest volume of loans comes from the European Investment Bank, followed by GTZ, with the remaining three donors not providing any loans at all.

An alternative way of looking at the donor's share of the total ODA is by use of the UNDP DCAS method for assessing External Assistance Trends, which divides all donors into the following categories:

1. Bilateral donors – this covers all individual countries (hereinafter the Bilateral Cluster).
2. UN System – this covers all the UN agencies such as UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank etc. (hereinafter the UN Cluster)
3. Non-UN Multilateral donors – this covers multilateral donors such as the EU and EIB (hereinafter the Multilateral Cluster).
4. Non-governmental Organisations – this covers all international NGOS such as World Vision, Oxfam, etc.)

The UNDP method presents itself as a much more politically neutral and therefore less controversial way of assessing the portions of ODA attributable to different donors or clusters of donors. Figure 4 presents the breakdown of ODA according to terms of assistance for the three donor systems. (The fourth category - assistance from NGOs - does not apply to this study as no NGO donors were surveyed by this DCR II.)



Once again, it is clear that the bulk of the loans arise from the Multilateral cluster, while the bulk of grants comes from the Bilateral Cluster. Significantly, the UN cluster accounts for only under 2% of the total ODA committed to South Africa, while the Multilateral cluster system, accounts for 38% and the Bilateral cluster makes up the remaining 60%.

9.4. SECTOR COMMITMENTS


Table 2 indicates the overall commitments to the sectors of destination.

SECTOR	COMMITMENT
Education	3,577,205
Health	720,357
Population Policies, Programmes & Reproductive Health	52,424
Water Supply and Sanitation	1,716,432
Government and Civil Society	2,919,647
Other Social Infrastructure & Services	1,773,106
Transport and Storage	237,975
Communications	35,698
Energy Generation and Supply	923,637
Banking and Financial Services	385,254
Business and Other Services	1,892,451
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	102,884
Industry, Mining & Construction	36,997
Trade and Tourism	25,588
General Environment Protection	381,661
Women in Development	26,327
Other Multisector	590,716
Unspecified/Unallocated	134,826
TOTAL	15,533,184

Table 2: Sector Commitments from 1994 to 1999 (ZAR 000s)


As Table 2 reveals, the largest commitments were made to the Education sector (23%), followed by Government and Civil Society (18.7%), Business and Other Services (12%), Other Social Infrastructure and Services (11.4%), Water Supply and Sanitation (11%), Energy Generation and Supply (6%) and, finally, Health (4.6%). Collectively, these seven sectors account for over four-fifths (86.7%) of total ODA commitments across all sectors. Comparison of the most funded sectors with the sectors identified by the South African government as priority areas (as defined in the RDP and MTEF) reveals that the majority of the priorities are covered by these sectors, especially those sectors directly relevant to the provision of basic services. The one and most notable exception is that of the Health sector, which does not appear to have attracted a level of support from the donor community commensurate with its prioritisation by the government.

The trends in year on year funding for the seven largest sectors is revealed in Figure .



Whereas earlier analyses of ODA commitments across all sectors revealed a clear upward trend from 1994 to 1997 and thereafter a downward trend from 1997 to 1999, the trends for individual sectors is much more variable and do not indicate any discernible patterns. Furthermore, with the exception of Energy Supply and Generation, which received a significant commitment in 1999 after a low base in 1998, all other sector commitments between 1997 and 1999 conform to a downward trend. The biggest drop in 1999 seems to occur for Water Supply and Sanitation, followed by Business and Other Services, Education, and then Government and Civil Society. Looking at the earlier years, all individual trends appear to be upward to year 1997. The only exception to this is Education, which received its greatest support during 1994. However, when one considers that the figure for this year includes a single project (which actually began in 1990 and ends in 2002) with a commitment of approximately R500m, it is apparent that the trend for this sector is not significantly different from that of the other six sectors.


9.5. ODA COMMITMENTS TO NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PROVINCIAL ADMINISTRATIONS



A breakdown of the ODA allocations to national government and provincial administrations indicates that the majority of the funds were committed to the national government (R12,588m or 82.1%) with the remaining funds being allocated amongst the nine provinces. However, it must be noted that these figures do not provide an entirely accurate picture of provincial allocations as the national commitments include a significant component that is received by the national government and then transferred to the provinces. Nevertheless, and excluding the indirect (via national government) commitments for the moment, it is useful to look at the ODA commitments that were made directly to the provinces. Figure 6 summarises the allocations of ODA to the nine provincial administrations.


The largest direct commitments were made to the Eastern Cape (R627m), followed by KwaZulu-Natal (R286m) and then Northern Province (R270m), with the North-West and Western Cape receiving the lowest commitments.

Direct provincial allocations may also be examined in terms of the extent to which those provinces deemed to be in greatest need were adequately serviced by ODA commitments. According to the Department of Finance¹², the nine provinces may be divided into three categories in terms of the level and extent of poverty within each of them. The first category covers the four poorest provinces of Eastern Cape, Free State, Northern Province and KwaZulu-Natal, the second covers the two provinces with the lowest poverty levels of Gauteng and Western Cape, and the third covers those provinces which fall in between the first and second categories, these being North West, Mpumalanga and Northern Cape. Figure 7 captures the direct ODA commitments from this perspective.



As Figure 7 indicates, the largest commitments were made to the provinces with the highest levels of poverty (69%), followed by provinces with moderate level of poverty (18%) and finally, the two with the lowest levels of poverty (13%). Superficially, then, it would appear that direct ODA commitment to provinces does conform to the level of need demonstrated by these provinces as assessed by the national government.


9.6. ODA COMMITMENTS TO INSTITUTIONAL RECIPIENTS




Analysis of ODA commitments according to institutional recipients reveals that of the total sum of R10,665m for which this data is available, the majority of funding was allocated in agreements with government (R5,804m or 54.6%), followed by parastatals (R2,604 or 24.4%), then non governmental organisations and other organisations located in civil society (R1,182m or 11%), and finally, institutions in the private sector (R1,075m or 10%). A further breakdown of these ODA commitments on an annual basis reveals the trends evident in Figure 8.

As Figure 8 demonstrates, commitments to government grew steadily between 1994 and 1998, (the only exception being 1995) and the shift in this trend in a downward direction is rather dramatic between 1998 and 1999. Commitments provided to parastatals reflects a similar trend as that for government, except that the trend peaks in 1997 and thereafter begins to decline to 1999. Commitments to civil society organisations also shows a steady increase from 1994 onwards, although the trend is much flatter and the peak reached in 1998 is only slightly higher than that of 1994. As with the private sector, the downward trend between 1998 and 1999 is much less pronounced for civil society organisations than it is for government and government-owned agencies (parastatals). The individual trends for these four types of institutional recipients clearly indicates that the biggest proportion of the decline in total ODA commitments between 1997/8 and 1999 is due to significantly reduced funding for state and state owned institutions. This corroborates the earlier conclusion that funding has declined mainly because the commitment to the first democratically elected government in South Africa has declined with the election of the second government in 1999.

Further, and as anticipated, inspection of the terms of assistance provided according to institutional recipients indicates that the majority of grants were provided to government and civil society organisations while the majority of loans were provided to parastatals and the private sector. Figure 9 details the terms of assistance according to the type of institutional recipient.



Finally, a look at the allocation of ODA commitments to government according to the three tiers at national, provincial and local level reveals, as is evident in Figure 10, that the biggest commitment was made to the national government (R5,215m) with provincial governments trailing a distant second (R532m) and local government an even more distant third (R55m).



In all fairness, it must be acknowledged that a portion of the allocation to national government would have been earmarked for the provinces, and that the poor support to local government probably reflects more on the painful realities of the slow transformation of local government in South Africa than it does on donors' level of responsibility towards this level of government. Indeed, the municipal demarcation process, on which the entire structure of local government is premised, is still being concluded, and the first local government elections are only scheduled for the latter part of 2000. It would be interesting to note the trend in support to local government from 2000 onwards, especially as this level of government is considered to be the principal engine of service delivery for the future.

10. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY

The considerable value of data, information and knowledge - and the opportunities presented by the proper management and use thereof - to the core business of any institution was quickly and irrevocably recognised by the global private sector in the latter part of the last century. The convergence of various information and communications technologies provided the ideal platform from which to launch what is now popularly termed the knowledge economy. Sadly, however, the same was not the case for the public sector institutions, be they global, regional or national. In the past decade, however, this situation has changed a fair deal. Not only has the value of knowledge and knowledge management to good governance gained greater credence in national governments, the concepts have also gained currency amongst global public institutions. Perhaps the most explicit indication of this from this sector was the World Bank report of 1999, subtitled *Knowledge for Development*. The report, which followed on the institution's Global Knowledge conference of 1997, captured much of the bank's recent thinking on knowledge and its utility to governance, and was also intended to stimulate a debate on the significance of knowledge for development, particularly within the developing world. Given its focus, the report logically drew into its discussion the significance of information and knowledge to the management and co-ordination of official donor assistance.

This report will necessarily focus on recommendations that are located in the exercise of information collection, sharing, management and utilisation. The experience of this DCR has provided the following lessons:

1. **Appreciation of Information** - the appreciation of the value of information to the management and co-ordination of ODA in South Africa does exist, in the main, in both the donor community and the IDC. This is manifest by the degree to which this exercise was accorded sufficient time, resources and support by all parties, and the degree of responsiveness by these institutions to aspects of design, planning and implementation. However, be this as it may, it is important to note that there is much room for improvement. Undertaking a data collection exercise represents only the first - though extremely important step - towards realising higher levels of co-operation and co-ordination between the South African government and donors. Indeed, the actual act of this data gathering exercise revealed valuable clues about the relationship between the IDC and the donors, clues which provide useful pointers for the future in terms of establishing the necessary mechanisms for the proper co-ordination and management of ODA. Principal amongst these is the need to capitalise on the fraternal relations that this exercise indicated in strategic ways.
2. **Classification System for Sectors of Destination** – this DCR employed the DAC Table 5 as it presented the ideal compromise between the sector categories of importance to the IDC and a classification system most acceptable to the diversity of donors. The use of the DAC classification has, however, not been without its problems. Principal amongst these is its exclusion of a specific category for Safety and Security, arguably one of the most critical factors for both South Africa as well as many other developing countries. Additionally, while the DAC system employs two very important cross cutting sectors – Women in Development and General Environmental Protection – it does not contain others that many would argue are equally, if not more, important, such as poverty

alleviation and job creation. It would be remiss to mention all of these as a critique of the DAC system alone, as the UNDP DCAS system is also not without its shortcomings. What is evident from this DCR is the need to refine and/or expand existing classification systems in a manner that would ensure greater relevance and import for both donors and recipient countries alike. Certainly this project would argue, at the very least, for the formulation of the poverty alleviation and job creation cross cutting categories, as these issue are almost always at the forefront of the agendas of developing countries.

3. Methodology for Data Collection and Authentication - This DCR employed a highly rigorous methodology for the collection, retrieval and verification of information. At the time of writing this report some donors had already responded to the team's issue of datasets to the donors for verification, and it is evident that there had been some errors in the data entry by donors but that these were now being successfully corrected. The significance of the method for collecting and verifying information cannot be underestimated, as it attests to the degree to which the data, and hence the analyses, are accepted as being valid and authentic. The acceptance of the information as valid and authentic, in turn, impacts considerably on the extent to which such information is utilised by donors and the recipient country towards the effective co-ordination and management of ODA.

11. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. IOD(SA), *Comparison of Development Co-operation Reviews*, October 1999.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. DAC, *Statistical Reporting Directives*, Revised Draft, March 2000.
5. IOD(SA), *Comparison of Development Co-operation Reviews*, October 1999.
6. Salih Booker, *South African DCR*, UNDP, 1993.
7. UNDP, *Human Development Report*, 1999.
8. Department of Finance, *Budget Review*, 1998.
9. Ibid.
10. Department of Finance, *Budget Review*, 1999.
11. Department of Finance, *Budget Review*, 2000.
12. Department of Finance, *Intergovernmental Fiscal Review*, 1999

12. APPENDIX A: FIELDS OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE DATA COLLECTION PROGRAMME

(Bullet points indicate closed ended options provided in the data collection programme)

PROJECT SPECIFIC DATA		
Project Details	Name of project	
	Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not started • Ongoing • Completed
	Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Education • Health • Population Policies/Programmes and Reproductive Health • Water Supply and Sanitation • Government and Civil Society • Other Social Infrastructure and Services • Transport and Storage • Communications • Energy generation and Supply • Banking and Financial Services • Business and other Services • Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing • Industry, Mining and Construction • Trade and Tourism • General Environmental Protection • Women in development • Other Multi-sector • Unspecified

Project Allocations	<i>Allocations to individual provinces</i>	
	<i>Allocations To National Government</i>	

Project Milestones	<i>Project start date</i>	
	<i>Project projected end data</i>	
	<i>Actual project end date</i>	
	<i>Year of commitment of funds</i>	

Agreement Details	<i>Signatory</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Government • Parastatal • NGO/Civil Society • Private Sector
	<i>Government type</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National • Provincial • Local
	<i>Implementing agency</i>	
	<i>Beneficiaries</i>	

Terms of Assistance Details:	<i>Grants: Technical expertise/Management</i>	
	<i>Grants: Other project funds</i>	
	<i>Total Grants</i>	
	<i>Loans: Technical expertise/Management</i>	
	<i>Loans: Other project funds</i>	
	<i>Total Loans</i>	
	<i>Total Guarantees</i>	
	<i>Grand Total committed for project</i>	

Disbursement	<i>Amount disbursed through RDP</i>	
	<i>Amount disbursed directly</i>	
	<i>Total disbursed</i>	

ANNUALISED DATA	
1.	Commitments per sector
2.	Disbursements per sector
3.	Commitments per province
4.	Disbursements per province